Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules by Ehlers, Lars & Klaus, Bettina
Cahier 2001-27
EHLERS, Lars
KLAUS, Bettina
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible
Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules
Département de sciences économiques 
Université de Montréal 
Faculté des arts et des sciences 
C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville 
Montréal (Québec) H3C 3J7 
Canada 
http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca  
SCECO-information@UMontreal.CA 
Téléphone : (514) 343-6539 
Télécopieur : (514) 343-7221 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ce cahier a également été publié par le Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en 
économie quantitative (CIREQ) sous le numéro 27-2001. 
 
This working paper was also published by the Center for Interuniversity Research in 
Quantitative Economics (CIREQ), under number 27-2001. 
 
 
 
ISSN 0709-9231 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAHIER 2001-27 
 
 
PROBABILISTIC ASSIGNMENTS OF IDENTICAL INDIVISIBLE OBJECTS AND 
UNIFORM PROBABILISTIC RULES 
 
 
Lars EHLERS1 and Bettina KLAUS2 
 
 
1 Centre de recherche et développement en économique (C.R.D.E.) and Département de 
sciences économiques, Université de Montréal 
 
2 Department of Economics, University of Nebraska at Lincoln 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
October 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ 
 
The authors thank William Thomson for many helpful comments. 
 
  
 
RÉSUMÉ 
 
 Nous considérons une approche probabiliste au problème de répartition de k objets 
identiques à un ensemble d’agents avec des préférences unimodales. Utilisant l’extension 
ordinale des préférences, nous caractérisons les classes de lois de probabilités uniformes 
par l’efficacité au sens de Pareto, la non-manipulation et l’absence d’envie. Nous 
montrons aussi que l’anonymat ne peut pas être remplacé par l’absence d’envie. Quand 
les agents ont une fonction d’utilité Von-Neumann-Morgenstern strictement adverse au 
risque, nous ramenons le problème de répartition de k objets identiques au problème 
d’allocation d’une quantité k d’un bien infiniment divisible. 
 
Mots clés : lois de probabilité, préférences unimodales, absence de manipulation, 
allocation uniforme 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible 
identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal 
extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by 
Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this 
characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk 
averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of 
assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely 
divisible commodity. 
 
Key words : probabilistic rules, single-peaked preferences, strategy-proofness, uniform 
allocations 
 
 
1 Introduction
We consider economic environments where a set of indivisible identical objects have to be
assigned to a set of individuals with single-peaked preferences. As an example, take the
assignment of the number of courses a professor in an economics department has to teach.
Each professor has a number of courses he nds optimal (probably somewhere between 0 to
4) and preferences are decreasing when moving away from that optimal amount in either
direction. If we are interested in \fair allocations", for instance allocations that respect
equal treatment of equals (if two individuals have the same preference relation, then they
should be indierent between each other's allotments), then the indivisibility assumption
may induce an impossibility. For simplicity, assume that we have to assign a course and none
of the professors in the department wants to teach it. Obviously there is no deterministic
way to do so that respects equal treatment of equals. However, allowing the rule to be
probabilistic solves our problem at least in an ex-ante sense: if each professor has to teach
the course with equal probability, then equal treatment of equals is satised (ex-ante).
The probabilistic allocation or rationing of indivisible objects has received recent atten-
tion. Two main models should be distinguished. In the rst one there are n objects and n
agents and each agent receives exactly one object. Any two objects are distinct and each
agent has a strict preference relation over the set of objects. For example, the agents are
workers and each object is a full-time job at a dierent company. The random assignment
of the objects to the agents is the subject of papers by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (1998,
2000), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (1999), and Cres and Moulin (1998).
In the second model there are k identical indivisible objects and n agents. Each agent
receives a certain number of objects and each object is assigned to some agent (free disposal
is not allowed). For instance, the objects are identical (non full-time) jobs that have to be
allocated among workers. This model is studied by Moulin (2000), Moulin and Stong (2000),
Sasaki (1997), and Kureishi (2000). In the rst two papers each agent demands a certain
number of objects and the total demand is greater than the number of objects available.
In the last two papers each agent has a single-peaked preference relation over the number
of objects he may receive. That is, there is a most preferred number of objects, called the
agent's peak, and preferences are strictly decreasing in either direction away from the peak.
A probabilistic rule chooses for each prole of preferences a probability distribution over
the set of allocations. The interpretation is that the nal allocation that we implement is
drawn according to this distribution. An agent compares two distributions over the set of
allocations by evaluating the marginal distributions that are induced over his allotments.
1
We consider the same model as Sasaki (1997) and Kureishi (2000), but we do not
only consider preferences that can be represented by von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions. First, we use the ordinal extension of preferences over allotments to probability
distributions over allotments. An agent prefers a distribution over his allotments to another
if the rst distribution places on each weak upper contour set at least the same probability
that is placed on it by the second distribution. The ordinal extension of preferences is
incomplete over the set of distributions. However, it is equivalent to the following. If
an agent prefers one distribution to another, then for each utility representation of his
preference relation the expected utility with respect to the distribution is greater than or
equal to the expected utility of the second one.
1
Using this extension we formulate the requirements of Pareto eciency, strategy-proofness
(no agent can gain by misrepresenting his preference relation), and no-envy (each agent
prefers his marginal distribution to each other agent's marginal distribution). Contrary to
the model with distinct objects (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 1999) it turns out that in our
model Pareto eciency is equivalent to ex-post eciency. Using the uniform rule (Benassy,
1982), where k units of an innitely divisible commodity are rationed as equally as possible,
we dene uniform probabilistic rules (Sasaki, 1997) in terms of their \uniform marginal
distributions".
2
We call a probabilistic rule a uniform probabilistic rule if for each prole the marginals
of the chosen distribution are equal to the uniform marginal distributions at this prole.
Our main result is that the class of uniform probabilistic rules is characterized by Pareto
eciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. This result is the probabilistic analogue to the
result of Sprumont (1991). He shows that when rationing k units of an innitely divisi-
ble commodity among a set of individuals with single-peaked preferences, the uniform rule
is the only deterministic rule satisfying the above combination of properties. Sprumont's
characterization remains valid if we replace no-envy by anonymity (Sprumont, 1991) or
equal treatment of equals (Ching, 1994). However, in our probabilistic setting this con-
clusion is not true. For example, any random dictatorship rule satises Pareto eciency,
strategy-proofness, and anonymity. It is an open question what the class of probabilistic
rules satisfying these properties looks like.
1
A considerable number of papers considers the ordinal extension of preferences, e.g., Abdulkadiroglu and
Sonmez (2000), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (1999), Ehlers (1998), Ehlers and Klaus (2001), Ehlers, Peters,
and Storcken (2000), and Gibbard (1977).
2
Independently, Moulin (2000) also used this trick in dening the uniform probabilistic rule of Sasaki
(1997).
2
In two related papers (Sasaki, 1997; Kureishi, 2000) agents are assumed to be strictly risk
averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, i.e., each agent evaluates distributions
on the basis of the expected utility relative to his utility function. They show that for a given
prole of utility functions, if a distribution is Pareto ecient, then each agent's marginal
distribution places probability 1 on two allotments that dier only by one unit. Using this
observation we show that then, the problem can be reduced to the problem of allocating
k units of an innitely divisible commodity among n agents with single-peaked preferences
over [0; k]. Then we apply the characterization of the (deterministic) uniform rule by Ching
(1994) and show that in the probabilistic model with strictly risk averse agents, the class
of uniform probabilistic rules is characterized by Pareto eciency, strategy-proofness, and
equal treatment of equals. Therefore, the results of Sasaki (1997) and Kureishi (2000) can
be interpreted as corollaries of Ching (1994).
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and
basic properties. In Section 3 we dene the class of uniform probabilistic rules and present
our main result. In Section 4 we prove the characterization. Finally, in Section 5 we focus
on strictly risk averse agents with von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
2 The Model and Basic Properties
We consider the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents
N = f1; : : : ; ng. Each agent i 2 N is equipped with a \single-peaked" preference relation
R
i
dened over the number of objects he receives; i.e., R
i
is dened over K  f0; 1; : : : ; kg
and there exists a number of objects p(R
i
) 2 K, called the peak of R
i
, with the following
property: for all x
i
; y
i
2 K, if x
i
< y
i
 p(R
i
) or x
i
> y
i
 p(R
i
), then y
i
P
i
x
i
. As usual,
x
i
R
i
y
i
means \x
i
is weakly preferred to y
i
", and x
i
P
i
y
i
means \x
i
is strictly preferred to
y
i
". By R we denote the class of all single-peaked preference relations over K. By R
N
we
denote the set of all (preference) proles R = (R
i
)
i2N
such that for all i 2 N , R
i
2 R.
We call x 2 K
N
a feasible allocation if
P
i2N
x
i
= k. Let X denote the set of all feasible
allocations. Note that jXj =
 
k+n 1
k

. A deterministic (allocation) rule  is a function that
selects for every R 2 R
N
a feasible allocation (R) 2 X. Each agent i 2 N only cares
about his own allotment 
i
(R) 2 K.
We extend the original analysis of deterministic rules by considering \probabilistic"
rules. A probabilistic (allocation) rule ' is a function that selects for every R 2 R
N
a
(probability) distribution over the set of feasible allocations X, denoted by '(R). Given
3
X0
 X, we denote by '(R)(X
0
) the probability that the distribution '(R) places on the set
X
0
. Since the set of feasible allocations X is nite, a distribution over X can be interpreted
as a lottery, or a simple gamble, on X. For X = fx
1
; : : : ; x
jXj
g we denote such a distribution
over the set of feasible allocationsX by [p
1
x
1
; : : : ; p
jXj
x
jXj
] where for all l 2 f1; : : : ; jXjg,
p
l
2 [0; 1] and
P
jXj
l=1
p
l
= 1. For notational convenience, when formalizing distributions, we
will only denote feasible allocations x
l
that occur with strictly positive probability p
l
> 0,
e.g., instead of [
1
2
 x
1
;
1
2
 x
2
; 0  x
3
; : : : ; 0  x
jXj
] we write [
1
2
 x
1
;
1
2
 x
2
].
For each agent i 2 N , let '
i
(R) denote the marginal distribution induced by '(R) over
his allotments in K. Each agent i 2 N only cares about his marginal distribution '
i
(R) on
K. A deterministic rule is a probabilistic rule that selects for every R 2 R
N
a distribution
placing probability 1 on a single allocation in X.
The following example demonstrates that two distributions having the same marginal
distributions need not be equal.
Example 1 Let N = f1; 2; 3g, k = 9, Q = [
1
3
 (3; 6; 0);
1
3
 (0; 3; 6);
1
3
 (6; 0; 3)], and
Q
0
= [
1
3
 (3; 0; 6);
1
3
 (6; 3; 0);
1
3
 (0; 6; 3)]. Then for all i 2 N , Q
i
= Q
0
i
, but Q 6= Q
0
: 
Remark 1 Let Q be a distribution on X. Then,
P
n
i=1
P
k
x
i
=0
Q
i
(x
i
)x
i
= k. Equivalently
to
P
n
i=1
P
k
x
i
=0
Q
i
(x
i
)x
i
we also use the notation
R
X
x
i
dQ
i
. 
We extend preferences on agents' allotments in K to marginal distributions on K. Our
extension is based on the concept of weak upper contour sets.
Given x
i
2 K and R
i
2 R, the weak upper contour set of x
i
at R
i
is dened as
B(x
i
; R
i
)  fy
i
2 K j y
i
R
i
x
i
g. Given a preference relation R
i
2 R and two marginal
distributions Q
i
; Q
0
i
on K, agent i weakly prefers Q
i
to Q
0
i
, if Q
i
assigns to each weak upper
contour set at least the probability that is assigned to this set by Q
0
i
. For notational conve-
nience we use the same symbols R
i
and P
i
to dene preferences over marginal distributions.
Ordinal Extension of Preferences: For all R
i
2 R and all marginal distributions
Q
i
; Q
0
i
on K, Q
i
R
i
Q
0
i
if and only if
for all x
i
2 K, Q
i
(B(x
i
; R
i
))  Q
0
i
(B(x
i
; R
i
)): (1)
Furthermore, Q
i
P
i
Q
0
i
if and only if Q
i
R
i
Q
0
i
and
for some y
i
2 K, Q
i
(B(y
i
; R
i
)) > Q
0
i
(B(y
i
; R
i
)): (2)
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Inequality (1) is a rst order stochastic dominance condition; in particular it requires
that the marginal distributions Q
i
and Q
0
i
are comparable in that respect. Therefore, our
extension is not complete on the set of all marginal distributions on K.
Our extension of preferences is equivalent to the following. Assume that each agent's
preference relation over lotteries can be represented by a utility function in the sense that
it can be used to compare two marginal distributions via the expected utilities relative to
this representation. Then (1) is equivalent to the fact that the expected utility relative to
any utility function representing R
i
is at Q greater or equal than at Q
0
. Thus, regardless
which utility function represents an agent's preference relation, he will weakly prefer Q to
Q
0
. For a further discussion of utility representation of preferences we refer to Section 5.
We are interested in Pareto eciency. Following the denition of Pareto eciency for
deterministic rules, a probabilistic rule is Pareto ecient if it only assigns \Pareto ecient
distributions on X"; i.e., a distribution assigned by the probabilistic rule cannot be changed
in such a way that no agent is worse o and some agent is better o.
Let Q, Q
0
be distributions on X. If for all i 2 N , Q
i
R
i
Q
0
i
and for some j 2 N , Q
j
P
j
Q
0
j
,
then we call Q a Pareto improvement over Q
0
.
Pareto Eciency: For all R 2 R
N
, there exists no Pareto improvement over '(R).
Remark 2 (Same-Sidedness) A deterministic rule  satises Pareto eciency if and
only if  satises same-sidedness; i.e., for all R 2 R
N
,
(i) if
P
i2N
p(R
i
)  k, then for all i 2 N , 
i
(R)  p(R
i
) and
(ii) if
P
i2N
p(R
i
)  k, then for all i 2 N , 
i
(R)  p(R
i
). 
A similar result holds for probabilistic rules: ex-post eciency is equivalent to same-
sidedness. Given x
i
; y
i
2 K such that x
i
 y
i
, let [x
i
; y
i
]  fx
i
; x
i
+ 1; : : : ; y
i
g.
Lemma 1 (Pareto Eciency) A probabilistic rule ' satises Pareto eciency if and
only if it satises same-sidedness; i.e., for all R 2 R
N
,
(i) if
P
i2N
p(R
i
)  k, then for all i 2 N , '
i
(R)([0; p(R
i
)]) = 1 and
(ii) if
P
i2N
p(R
i
)  k, then for all i 2 N , '
i
(R)([p(R
i
); k]) = 1.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that if ' satises Pareto eciency, then (i) and (ii)
hold. To show the converse, suppose ' satises same-sidedness. Suppose that ' violates
5
Pareto eciency for some R 2 R
N
. Thus, there exists a distribution Q over X such that
for all i 2 N , Q
i
R
i
'
i
(R) and for some j 2 N , Q
j
P
j
'
j
(R). Without loss of generality,
let k 
P
i2N
p(R
i
) and for all i 2 N , Q
i
(R)([0; p(R
i
)]) = 1. Given i 2 N , the function
f
i
: X ! K denotes the projection of X onto i's coordinate, i.e., for all x 2 X, f
i
(x) = x
i
.
Since Q and '(R) satisfy same-sidedness and for all i 2 N , Q
i
R
i
'
i
(R), it follows for all
i 2 N ,
Z
X
f
i
dQ =
Z
[0;p(R
i
)]
x
i
dQ
i

Z
[0;p(R
i
)]
x
i
d'
i
(R) =
Z
X
f
i
d'(R):
Thus, for all i 2 N ,
R
X
f
i
dQ 
R
X
f
i
d'(R), and for some j 2 N ,
R
X
f
j
dQ >
R
X
f
j
d'(R).
Hence,
Z
X
X
i2N
f
i
dQ =
X
i2N
Z
X
f
i
dQ >
X
i2N
Z
X
f
i
d'(R) =
Z
X
X
i2N
f
i
d'(R): (3)
Note that for all x 2 X,
P
i2N
f
i
(x) = k. Hence,
Z
X
X
i2N
f
i
dQ = k and
Z
X
X
i2N
f
i
d'(R) = k:
Now, the previous two facts contradict (3). 
Conditions (i) and (ii) in Lemma 1 imply that an allocation chosen by the probabilistic
rule ' satises same-sidedness and therefore Pareto eciency. Hence, Lemma 1 states that
Pareto eciency and ex-post Pareto eciency are equivalent in our model. Bogomolnaia
and Moulin (1999) show that this equivalence is not valid when assigning heterogenous
indivisible objects to individuals.
Next we introduce strategy-proofness for probabilistic rules. By strategy-proofness no
agent can ever benet by misrepresenting his preference relation.
3
Given R 2 R
N
and M  N , the restriction (R
i
)
i2M
2 R
M
of R to M is denoted by
R
M
. We also use the notation R
 i
= R
Nnfig
. For example, (

R
i
; R
 i
) denotes the prole
obtained from R by replacing R
i
by

R
i
.
Strategy-Proofness: For all R 2 R
N
, all i 2 N , and all

R
i
2 R, '
i
(R) R
i
'
i
(

R
i
; R
 i
).
3
In game theoretical terms, a rule satises strategy-proofness if in its associated direct revelation game
form, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to announce his true preference relation.
6
Note that our notion of strategy-proofness also requires that the marginal distributions
that are assigned by the probabilistic rule before and after any unilateral deviation are
comparable.
By anonymity the names of the agents do not matter. More precisely, an anonymous
probabilistic rule is symmetric in its arguments.
Let 
N
be the class of all permutations on N . Then for all R 2 R
N
and all  2 
N
, by
R

we mean (R
(i)
)
i2N
.
Anonymity: For all R 2 R
N
, all  2 
N
, and all i 2 N , '
(i)
(R) = '
i
(R

).
No-envy states that no agent strictly prefers the marginal distribution of another agent
to his own.
No-Envy: For all R 2 R
N
and all i; j 2 N , '
i
(R) R
i
'
j
(R).
No-envy also requires that the agents' marginal distributions that are assigned by the
probabilistic rule are comparable.
Equal treatment of equals, a weakening of no-envy and of anonymity, requires that if
two agents have the same preference relations, then each of them is indierent between his
marginal distribution and the other agent's marginal distribution.
Equal Treatment of Equals: For all R 2 R
N
and all i; j 2 N , if R
i
= R
j
, then
'
i
(R) I
i
'
j
(R).
3 The Uniform Probabilistic Correspondence
In identifying probabilistic rules that satisfy a certain combination of properties, we will
not be able to determine the exact distribution for each prole. All requirements are
formulated with respect to marginal distributions and as demonstrated in Example 1 those
do not uniquely determine the original distribution. We will only be able to show that a
probabilistic rule satises a certain list of requirements if and only if for each prole the
marginal distributions are of a certain form. Therefore, we introduce correspondences that
assign to each prole a set of distributions.
7
The following \uniform correspondence" assigns to each prole exactly the distributions
that induce \uniform marginal distributions" on each agent's allotments: for each prole of
peaks (p(R
i
))
i2N
calculate the so-called uniform allocation for R. Denote this allocation by
~
U(R). Without loss of generality, suppose that R is in excess demand, i.e.,
P
i2N
p(R
i
) > k
(the denition for the excess supply case is similar). Thus, for some  2 [0; k], we have
that for all i 2 N ,
~
U
i
(R) = min(p(R
i
); ). For each agent we choose the following uniform
marginal distribution f
i
(R) over his allotments. If
~
U
i
(R) = p(R
i
), then f
i
(R) places proba-
bility 1 on p(R
i
). Otherwise, calculate x

2 f0; 1; : : : ; kg such that  belongs to the interval
with endpoints x

and x

+1. Then calculate weights  and (1 ) on the endpoints such
that  equals the convex combination of the two endpoints according to the weights, i.e.,
 = x

+ (1  )(x

+ 1) where  2 [0; 1]. Then, the uniform marginal distribution f
i
(R)
places probability  on x

and probability 1   on x

+ 1.
Uniform Probabilistic Correspondence, U : Let R 2 R
N
and Q be a distribution
over X. Then Q 2 U(R) if and only if the following holds.
(i) Excess Demand:
P
i2N
p(R
i
) > k.
Let
~
U
i
(R) = min(p(R
i
); ) where  2 R
+
solves
P
i2N
~
U
i
(R) = k.
Determine x

2 K such that  2 [x

; x

+ 1[. Then for all i 2 N ,
(a) if p(R
i
)  x

, then Q
i
(p(R
i
)) = 1 and
(b) if p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, then Q
i
(x

+ 1) =   x

and Q
i
(x

) = 1  (  x

).
(ii) Balanced Demand:
P
i2N
p(R
i
) = k. Then for all i 2 N , Q
i
(p(R
i
)) = 1.
(iii) Excess Supply:
P
i2N
p(R
i
) < k.
Let
~
U
i
(R) = max(p(R
i
); ) where  2 R
+
solves
P
i2N
~
U
i
(R) = k.
Determine x

2 K such that  2 ]x

; x

+ 1]. Then for all i 2 N ,
(a) if p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, then Q
i
(p(R
i
)) = 1 and
(b) if p(R
i
)  x

, then Q
i
(x

+ 1) =   x

and Q
i
(x

) = 1  (  x

).
We say that a probabilistic rule ' is a uniform probabilistic rule if for all R 2 R
N
, '(R) 2
U(R). The following example of a probabilistic rule proves that the uniform correspondence
is non-empty.
8
Example 2 We dene the uniform probabilistic rule U as follows (Sasaki, 1997; in dening
the uniform probabilistic rule U Moulin (2000) uses the same trick as we do
4
in dening
the correspondence U). Let R 2 R
N
.
(i) Excess Demand:
P
i2N
p(R
i
) > k.
Without loss of generality, let

N = fi 2 N j p(R
i
)  x

+ 1g = f1; : : : ; ng and
~
N = fi 2 N j p(R
i
)  x

g = fn+1; : : : ; ng. Then we obtain U(R) as follows: in each
allocation that occurs at U(R) with positive probability, each agent in
~
N receives his
peak amount and each agent in

N receives either x

or x

+ 1. Note that for each
i 2

N , (x

+ 1) P
i
x

and that exactly n(   x

) agents in

N can receive x

+ 1.
We obtain U(R) by placing equal probability on all allocations where all agents in
~
N
receive their peak amounts, n(  x

) agents in

N receive x

+ 1, and the remaining
agents in

N receive x

. Hence, U(R) is obtained by placing equal probabilities on
exactly
 
n
n( x

)

allocations. Note that
(a) if p(R
i
)  x

, then U
i
(R)(p(R
i
)) = 1 and
(b) if p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, then U
i
(R)(x

+ 1) =   x

and U
i
(R)(x

) = 1  (  x

).
(ii) Balanced Demand:
P
i2N
p(R
i
) = k. Then, U(R) = [1  (p(R
1
); : : : ; p(R
n
))].
(iii) Excess Supply:
P
i2N
p(R
i
) < k.
Without loss of generality, let

N = fi 2 N j p(R
i
)  x

g = f1; : : : ; ng and
~
N = fi 2
N j p(R
i
)  x

+ 1g = fn + 1; : : : ; ng. Then we obtain U(R) as follows: in each
allocation that occurs at U(R) with positive probability, each agent in
~
N receives his
peak amount and each agent in

N receives either x

or x

+ 1. Note that for i 2

N ,
x

P
i
(x

+ 1) and that exactly n   n(   x

) agents in

N can receive x

. In other
words, n(   x

) of agents in

N will receive x

+ 1. We obtain U(R) by placing
equal probability on all allocations where all agents in
~
N receive their peak amounts,
n( x

) agents in

N receive x

+1, and the remaining agents in

N receive x

. Hence,
U(R) is obtained by placing equal probabilities on exactly
 
n
n( x

)

allocations. Note
that
(a) if p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, then U
i
(R)(p(R
i
)) = 1 and
(b) if p(R
i
)  x

, then U
i
(R)(x

+ 1) =   x

and U
i
(R)(x

) = 1  (  x

). 
4
Moulin (2000) and we found this trick independently.
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Example 3 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and k = 2. Let R 2 R
N
be such that for all i 2 N ,
p(R
i
) = 1. Then,

N = N and
U(R) = [
1
6
 (1; 1; 0; 0);
1
6
 (1; 0; 1; 0);
1
6
 (1; 0; 0; 1);
1
6
 (0; 1; 1; 0);
1
6
 (0; 1; 0; 1);
1
6
 (0; 0; 1; 1)]:
Let Q = [
1
2
 (1; 1; 0; 0);
1
2
 (0; 0; 1; 1)] and Q
0
= [
1
2
 (1; 0; 0; 1);
1
2
 (0; 1; 1; 0)]. Then for all
i 2 N , Q
i
= U
i
(R) = Q
0
i
(Q;Q
0
; U(R) 2 U(R)), but U(R) 6= Q 6= Q
0
6= U(R). 
Our main result is that, similarly as in the deterministic setting (Sprumont, 1991; Ching,
1992; Ehlers, 2000), Pareto eciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy determine \uniform
allocations".
Theorem 1 Uniform probabilistic rules are the only probabilistic rules satisfying Pareto
eciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy.
Remark 3 Theorem 1 is a tight characterization since we already know from the determin-
istic framework that all properties are logically independent (see Sprumont 1991 and Ching
1992). However, in contrast to the deterministic framework, we cannot replace no-envy
with anonymity or weaken it to equal treatment of equals (see Example 4). 
Example 4 Let N = f1; 2g and R 2 R
N
.
 If p(R
1
) + p(R
2
) 6= k, then
 (R) = [
1
2
 (p(R
1
); k   p(R
1
));
1
2
 (k   p(R
2
); p(R
2
))]:
 If p(R
1
) + p(R
2
) = k, then
 (R) = [1  (p(R
1
); p(R
2
))]:
The probabilistic rule  satises Pareto eciency, strategy-proofness, and anonymity.
However, as we will demonstrate next,  violates no-envy.
Let k = 5, p(R
1
) = 5, p(R
2
) = 1 and 5 P
2
0. Then,
 (R) = [
1
2
 (5; 0);
1
2
 (4; 1)];
and
 
2
(R)(B(5; R
2
)) =
1
2
< 1 =  
1
(R)(B(5; R
2
)):
Thus, we do not have that  
2
(R)R
2
 
1
(R), which contradicts no-envy ; more precisely, the
comparability condition that is incorporated in no-envy is violated. 
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Example 4 can be easily extended to an arbitrary number of agents. More precisely, the
rule  is the random dictatorship rule for two agents. For an arbitrary number of agents,
the random dictatorship rule is Pareto ecient, strategy-proof, and anonymous. Note that
all convex combinations of uniform probabilistic rules and the random dictatorship rule
satisfy Pareto eciency, strategy-proofness, and anonymity. It is an open question whether
there are other probabilistic rules that satisfy this list of properties.
4 Proof of the Characterization
It is straightforward to check that each uniform probabilistic rule satises Pareto eciency,
strategy-proofness, and no-envy. Conversely, let ' be a probabilistic rule satisfying Pareto
eciency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We have to show that for all R 2 R
N
, '(R) 2
U(R).
Pareto eciency and Lemma 1 imply that if demand is balanced, then (ii) in the de-
nition of U holds. In the remainder of this section we prove that if R is in excess demand,
then (i) in the denition of U holds. The proof of (iii), i.e., excess supply, is similar.
Recall that for all x
i
; y
i
2 K such that x
i
 y
i
, we have [x
i
; y
i
]  fx
i
; x
i
+ 1; : : : ; y
i
g.
Lemma 2 Let R 2 R
N
be such that
P
i2N
p(R
i
) > k. Then for all i 2 N ,
'
i
(R)([min(p(R
i
); x

); p(R
i
)]) = 1:
Proof. Let i 2 N . We consider two cases.
Case 1: p(R
i
)  x

+ 1. We have to show that '
i
(R)([x

; p(R
i
)]) = 1. Assume, by
contradiction, that
'
i
(R)([x

; p(R
i
)]) < 1: (4)
Let R
0
i
2 R be such that p(R
0
i
) = p(R
i
) and for all x
i
2 [p(R
i
); k], B(x
i
; R
0
i
) = [p(R
i
); x
i
].
Dene R
0
 (R
0
i
; R
 i
). By (4), Pareto eciency (PE), and strategy-proofness (SP),
1
(4)
> '
i
(R)([x

; p(R
i
)])
PE
= '
i
(R)(B(x

; R
i
))
SP
 '
i
(R
0
)(B(x

; R
i
))
PE
= '
i
(R
0
)([x

; p(R
i
)]).
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Thus,
'
i
(R
0
)([x

; p(R
i
)]) < 1: (5)
Hence, by Pareto eciency (PE), no-envy (NE), and the construction of R
0
i
, for all j 6= i,
1
(5)
> '
i
(R
0
)([x

; p(R
i
)])
PE
= '
i
(R
0
)([x

; k]) = '
i
(R
0
)(B(x

; R
0
i
))
NE
 '
j
(R
0
)(B(x

; R
0
i
)) = '
j
(R
0
)([x

; k]):
Thus, for all j 2 N ,
'
j
(R
0
)([x

; k]) < 1: (6)
Let S

 fj 2 N j p(R
j
)  x

+1g. By the denition of  and
P
j2N
p(R
0
j
) =
P
j2N
p(R
j
) >
k, S

6= ;.
For all T  S

, dene R
T
= ((R
T
j
)
j2T
; R
0
NnT
) as follows. For all j 2 T ,
 p(R
T
j
) = x

and
 for all x
j
2 [x

; k], B(x
j
; R
T
j
) = [x

; x
j
].
Let j 2 S

. If
P
l2N
p(R
fjg
l
) > k, then by (6) and strategy-proofness (SP),
1
(6)
> '
j
(R
0
)([x

; k])  '
j
(R
0
)(B(x

; R
0
j
))
SP
 '
j
(R
fjg
)(B(x

; R
0
j
))  '
j
(R
fjg
)(x

)
= '
j
(R
fjg
)(p(R
fjg
j
)) = '
j
(R
fjg
)([x

; k]):
(7)
By (7) and no-envy (NE), for all l 6= j,
1
(7)
> '
j
(R
fjg
)([x

; k]) = '
j
(R
fjg
)(B(k;R
fjg
j
))
NE
 '
l
(R
fjg
)(B(k;R
fjg
j
)) = '
l
(R
fjg
)([x

; k]):
Thus, for all l 2 N , '
l
(R
fjg
)([x

; k]) < 1. Hence, by repeated application of the above
arguments, if for T  S

,
P
l2N
p(R
T
l
) > k, then for all l 2 N ,
'
l
(R
T
)([x

; k]) < 1: (8)
Now x T
0
 S

such that for some j 2 S

nT
0
,
P
l2N
p(R
T
0
[fjg
l
)  k <
P
l2N
p(R
T
0
l
):
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By the denition of , T
0
6= ;. Let

R
j
2 R be such that p(

R
j
) = k  
P
l 6=j
p(R
T
0
l
).
Dene

R  (

R
j
; R
T
0
 j
). Note that
x

 p(

R
j
) < p(R
T
0
j
) and
X
l2N
p(

R
l
) = k:
By Pareto eciency, '
j
(

R)(p(

R
j
)) = 1. Since p(

R
j
) 2 B(x

; R
T
0
j
), it follows that '
j
(

R)(B(x

; R
T
0
j
)) =
1. But this implies a contradiction because by strategy-proofness (SP),
1
(8)
> '
j
(R
T
0
)([x

; k])  '
j
(R
T
0
)(B(x

; R
T
0
j
))
SP
 '
j
(

R)(B(x

; R
T
0
j
)) = 1:
Therefore, (4) was wrong and the statement for Case 1 is proven.
Case 2: p(R
i
)  x

. We have to show that '
i
(R)(p(R
i
)) = 1. Assume, by contradiction,
that
'
i
(R)(p(R
i
)) < 1: (9)
Let R
0
i
2 R be such that p(R
0
i
) = p(R
i
) and for all x
i
2 [p(R
i
); k], B(x
i
; R
0
i
) = [p(R
i
); x
i
].
Dene R
0
 (R
0
i
; R
 i
). By strategy-proofness and (9), '
i
(R
0
)(p(R
i
)) < 1. By Pareto
eciency (PE), no-envy (NE), and the construction of R
0
i
, for all j 2 N ,
1 > '
i
(R
0
)(p(R
i
))
PE
= '
i
(R
0
)([p(R
i
); k]) = '
i
(R
0
)(B(k;R
0
i
))
NE
 '
j
(R
0
)(B(k;R
0
i
)) = '
j
(R
0
)([p(R
i
); k]):
Particularly, because p(R
i
)  x

, for all j 2 N ,
'
j
(R
0
)([x

; k]) < 1: (10)
However, for some j 2 N , p(R
0
j
)  x

+ 1. Hence, in contradiction to (10), by Case 1 and
Pareto eciency (PE), 1 = '
j
(R
0
)([x

; p(R
0
j
)])
PE
= '
j
(R
0
)([x

; k]). 
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, we prove that for all R 2 R
N
, if
P
i2N
p(R
i
) > k,
then for all i 2 N , '
i
(R) = U
i
(R); i.e.,
(a) if p(R
i
)  x

, then '
i
(R)(p(R
i
)) = 1 = U
i
(R)(p(R
i
)) and
(b) if p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, then '
i
(R)(x

+ 1) =    x

= U
i
(R)(x

+ 1) and '
i
(R)(x

) =
1  (  x

) = U
i
(R)(x

).
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Let R 2 R
N
be such that
P
i2N
p(R
i
) > k. By Lemma 2, for all i 2 N , '
i
(R)([min(p(R
i
); x

); p(R
i
)]) =
1. Thus, for all i 2 N , if p(R
i
)  x

, then
'
i
(R)(p(R
i
)) = 1: (11)
Hence, (11) implies (a); i.e., if p(R
i
)  x

, then '
i
(R) = U
i
(R).
Next, we prove (b); i.e., if p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, then '
i
(R) = U
i
(R). We consider two cases.
Case 1: For some j 2 N , R
j
2 R is such that p(R
j
) = x

+ 1, and for all x
j
2 [p(R
j
); k],
B(x
j
; R
j
) = [p(R
j
); x
j
].
By Pareto eciency (PE), no-envy (NE), and the structure of R
j
, for all i 2 N such
that p(R
i
)  x

+ 1,
'
j
(R)(p(R
j
))
PE
= '
j
(R)(B(k;R
j
))
NE
 '
i
(R)(B(k;R
j
))
PE
= '
i
(R)([x

+ 1; p(R
i
)]):
Similarly, for all i 2 N such that p(R
i
)  x

+ 1,
'
i
(R)([x

+ 1; p(R
i
)])
PE
= '
i
(R)(B(x

+ 1; R
i
))
NE
 '
j
(R)(B(x

+ 1; R
i
))
PE
= '
j
(R)(p(R
j
)):
Hence, for all i 2 N such that p(R
i
)  x

+ 1,
'
i
(R)([x

+ 1; p(R
i
)]) = '
j
(R)(p(R
j
)): (12)
Thus, by Lemma 2, for all i 2 N such that p(R
i
)  x

+ 1,
'
i
(R)(x

) = '
j
(R)(x

) = 1  '
j
(R)(p(R
j
)). (13)
We consider two subcases.
Case 1.1: For all i 2 N , p(R
i
)  x

+ 1.
Thus, by Pareto eciency, for all i 2 N , '
i
(R)([x

+ 2; k]) = 0. Then by Lemma 2 and
(13), for all i; l 2 N such that p(R
i
) = p(R
l
) = x

+ 1,
'
i
(R)(x

) = '
l
(R)(x

) and '
i
(R)(x

+ 1) = '
l
(R)(x

+ 1): (14)
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Recall that by Remark 1 and (a),
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)=x

+1
'
i
(R)(x

)x

+
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)=x

+1
'
i
(R)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1) = k  
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)x

p(R
i
):
(15)
Recall that by the denition of  and x

,
k =
X
i2N
min(p(R
i
); ) =
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)x

p(R
i
) +
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)=x

+1
: (16)
Furthermore, note that for all i 2 N such that p(R
i
) = x

+ 1,
'
i
(R)(x

) + '
i
(R)(x

+ 1) = 1: (17)
Using (15), (16), and (17), it follows that
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)=x

+1
x

+
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)=x

+1
'
i
(R)(x

+ 1) =
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)=x

+1
:
This and (14) imply that for all i 2 N such that p(R
i
) = x

+ 1, '
i
(R)(x

+ 1) =   x

.
Thus, for all i 2 N such that p(R
i
) = x

+ 1, '
i
(R)(x

) = 1   (   x

). This proves (b);
i.e., if p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, then '
i
(R) = U
i
(R). This completes the proof for Case 1.1.
Case 1.2: For some l 2 N , p(R
l
)  x

+ 2.
If for all l 2 N such that p(R
l
)  x

+ 2, '
l
(R)([x

+ 2; k]) = 0, then similarly as in
Case 1.1 it follows that p(R
l
)  x

+ 1 implies '
l
(R) = U
l
(R). Assume, by contradiction,
that for some l 2 N such that p(R
l
)  x

+ 2,
'
l
(R)([x

+ 2; k]) > 0: (18)
Let R
0
l
2 R be such that R
0
l
= R
j
and R
0
 (R
0
l
; R
 l
). By Pareto eciency (PE) and
strategy-proofness (SP),
'
l
(R
0
)(x

+ 1)
PE
= '
l
(R
0
)([x

+ 1; k]) = '
l
(R
0
)(B(k;R
0
l
))
SP
 '
l
(R)(B(k;R
0
l
)) = '
l
(R)([x

+ 1; k])
and
'
l
(R)([x

+ 1; k])
PE
= '
l
(R)(B(x

+ 1; R
l
))
SP
 '
l
(R
0
)(B(x

+ 1; R
l
))
PE
= '
l
(R
0
)(x

+ 1):
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Hence,
'
l
(R
0
)(x

+ 1) = '
l
(R)([x

+ 1; k]) and (19)
'
l
(R
0
)(x

) = '
l
(R)(x

): (20)
Suppose that for all i 2 N such that p(R
0
i
)  x

+2, '
i
(R
0
)([x

+2; k]) = 0. Let N
0
 fi 2
N j p(R
i
)  x

+ 1g = fi 2 N j p(R
0
i
)  x

+ 1g.
Consider prole R and recall from Case 1 that for all i 2 N
0
, '
i
(R)([x

+ 1; p(R
i
)]) =
'
j
(R)(p(R
j
)) and '
i
(R)(x

) = '
j
(R)(x

). In particul, for all i 2 N
0
,
'
i
(R)([x

+ 1; p(R
i
)]) = '
j
(R)(p(R
j
)) = '
l
(R)([x

+ 1; p(R
l
)]) and (21)
'
i
(R)(x

) = '
j
(R)(x

) = '
l
(R)(x

): (22)
Consider prole R
0
and recall from Case 1 that for all i 2 N
0
, '
i
(R
0
)([x

+ 1; p(R
0
i
)]) =
'
j
(R
0
)(p(R
j
)) and '
i
(R
0
)(x

) = '
j
(R
0
)(x

). In particular, for all i 2 N
0
,
'
i
(R
0
)(x

+ 1) = '
j
(R
0
)(p(R
0
j
)) = '
l
(R
0
)(x

+ 1) and (23)
'
i
(R
0
)(x

) = '
j
(R
0
)(x

) = '
l
(R
0
)(x

): (24)
Hence, for all i 2 N
0
,
'
i
(R
0
)(x

+ 1)
(23)
= '
l
(R
0
)(x

+ 1)
(19)
= '
l
(R)([x

+ 1; k])
(21)
= '
i
(R)([x

+ 1; p(R
i
)]):
(25)
Furthermore, for all i 2 N
0
,
'
i
(R
0
)(x

)
(24)
= '
l
(R
0
)(x

)
(20)
= '
l
(R)(x

)
(22)
= '
i
(R)(x

):
(26)
Since for all i 2 N such that p(R
0
i
)  x

+ 2, '
i
(R
0
)([x

+ 2; k]) = 0, (25) implies that for
all i 2 N
0
,
k
X
x
i
=x

+1
'
i
(R
0
)(x
i
)x
i
= '
i
(R
0
)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1) 
k
X
x
i
=x

+1
'
i
(R)(x
i
)x
i
. (27)
In particular, by (18) and (19),
'
l
(R
0
)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1) <
k
X
x
l
=x

+1
'
l
(R)(x
l
)x
l
. (28)
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Hence, (26), (27), and (28) imply
X
i2N
0
 
'
i
(R
0
)(x

)x

+ '
i
(R
0
)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1)

<
X
i2N
0
 
k
X
x
i
=x

'
i
(R)(x
i
)x
i
!
: (29)
By Remark 1,
X
i2N
0
 
'
i
(R
0
)(x

)x

+ '
i
(R
0
)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1)

= k  
X
i2N such that
p(R
0
i
)=p(R
i
)x

p(R
i
)
and
X
i2N
0
 
k
X
x
i
=x

'
i
(R)(x
i
)x
i
!
= k  
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)x

p(R
i
):
Hence,
X
i2N
0
 
'
i
(R
0
)(x

)x

+ '
i
(R
0
)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1)

=
X
i2N
0
 
k
X
x
i
=x

'
i
(R)(x
i
)x
i
!
;
which contradicts (29). Thus, our assumption that for all i 2 N such that p(R
0
i
)  x

+ 2
we have '
i
(R
0
)([x

+ 2; k]) = 0 was wrong. Hence, for some h 2 N , p(R
0
h
)  x

+ 2 and
'
h
(R)([x

+ 2; k]) > 0. Similarly as before, we replace R
0
h
by R
j
and show that for some
m 2 N , p(R
0
m
)  x

+ 2 and '
m
(R
0
 h
; R
j
)([x

+ 2; k]) > 0. Since N is nite and at each
step the number of agents having a peak greater than or equal to x

+ 2 is smaller, we
nally get a contradiction. Therefore, (b) holds for Case 1; i.e., if p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, then
'
i
(R) = U
i
(R).
Case 2: There exists no j 2 N such that p(R
j
) = x

+1 or for R
j
such that p(R
j
) = x

+1
there exists some x
j
2 [p(R
j
); k] such that B(x
j
; R
j
) 6= [p(R
j
); x
j
].
We have to show (b); i.e., if p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, then '
i
(R) = U
i
(R). First we show that
for all i 2 N such that p(R
i
)  x

+ 1,
'
i
(R)(x

) = U
i
(R)(x

): (30)
Assume, by contradiction, that for some j 2 N such that p(R
j
)  x

+ 1, '
j
(R)(x

) 6=
U
j
(R)(x

).
Consider R
0
j
2 R such that p(R
0
j
) = x

+ 1, and for all x
j
2 [p(R
0
j
); k], B(x
j
; R
0
j
) =
[p(R
0
j
); x
j
]. Dene R
0
 (R
0
j
; R
 j
). By strategy-proofness,
'
j
(R)([x

+ 1; k]) = '
j
(R)(B(x

+ 1; R
j
))
SP
 '
j
(R
0
)(B(x

+ 1; R
j
)) = '
j
(R
0
)([x

+ 1; k])
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and
'
j
(R
0
)([x

+ 1; k]) = '
j
(R
0
)(B(k;R
0
j
))
SP
 '
j
(R)(B(k;R
0
j
))
= '
j
(R)([x

+ 1; k]):
Hence, '
j
(R
0
)([x

+ 1; k]) = '
j
(R)([x

+ 1; k]). By Lemma 2,
'
j
(R
0
)(x

) = 1  '
j
(R
0
)([x

+ 1; k]) = 1  '
j
(R)([x

+ 1; k]) = '
j
(R)(x

)
6= U
j
(R)(x

) = U
j
(R
0
)(x

);
which contradicts Case 1. Thus, (30) is proven. Hence, by Lemma 2, for all i 2 N such
that p(R
i
)  x

+ 1,
'
i
(R)([x

+ 1; k]) = 1  '
i
(R)(x

)
= 1  U
i
(R)(x

)
= U
i
(R)(x

+ 1):
If for all i 2 N such that p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, '
i
(R)([x

+ 2; k]) = 0, then for all i 2 N such
that p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, '
i
(R) = U
i
(R), which proves (b). Suppose, by contradiction, that for
some j 2 N such that p(R
j
)  x

+ 1, '
j
(R)([x

+ 2; k]) > 0. So,
U
j
(R)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1) <
k
X
x
j
=x

+1
'
j
(R)(x
i
)x
i
. (31)
Let N
0
 fi 2 N j p(R
i
)  x

+ 1g. Since for all i 2 N
0
, U
i
(R)([x

+ 2; k]) = 0,
U
i
(R)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1) 
k
X
x
i
=x

+1
'
i
(R)(x
i
)x
i
. (32)
Hence, by (30), (31), and (32),
X
i2N
0
(U
i
(R)(x

)x

+ U
j
(R)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1)) <
X
i2N
0
 
k
X
x
i
=x

'
i
(R)(x
i
)x
i
!
: (33)
By Remark 1,
X
i2N
0
 
k
X
x
i
=x

'
i
(R)(x
i
)x
i
!
= k  
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)x

p(R
i
)
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and
X
i2N
0
(U
i
(R)(x

)x

+ U
i
(R)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1)) = k  
X
i2N such that
p(R
i
)x

p(R
i
):
Hence,
X
i2N
0
(U
i
(R)(x

)x

+ U
i
(R)(x

+ 1)(x

+ 1)) =
X
i2N
0
 
k
X
x
i
=x

'
i
(R)(x
i
)x
i
!
;
which contradicts (33) and nishes the proof of (b); i.e., if p(R
i
)  x

+ 1, then '
i
(R) =
U
i
(R). 
5 Von-Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Functions
In this section we assume that agents have single-peaked preferences that satisfy the von
Neuman Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility property; i.e., for any preference relation R
i
(i) there exists a utility function u
i
that represents R
i
and
5
(ii) each agent i evaluates marginal distributions via the expected utility relative to u
i
.
Thus, given Q
i
 [p
0
i
 0; p
1
i
 1; : : : ; p
k
i
k] where p
l
i
denotes the probability that agent
i receives l 2 K objects,
u
i
(Q
i
) = u
i
([p
0
i
 0; p
1
i
 1; : : : ; p
k
i
 k]) =
k
X
l=0
p
l
i
u
i
(l):
Furthermore, we assume that all agents are strictly risk averse; i.e., for all l 2 f1; : : : ; k 
1g,
u
i
(l)  u
i
(l   1) > u
i
(l + 1)  u
i
(l):
Let V denote the class of all vNM-utility functions that exhibit strict risk aversion. Let
V
N
denote the set of all (vNM-utility) proles u = (u
i
)
i2N
such that for all i 2 N , u
i
2 V.
Note that if a utility function exhibits strict risk aversion, then it is single-peaked. Given
5
A utility function u
i
represents a preference relation R
i
if and only if
x R
i
y , u
i
(x)  u
i
(y):
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ui
2 V, there exists R
i
2 R such that u
i
represents R
i
. We dene the peak p(u
i
) of u
i
by
p(u
i
)  p(R
i
). Let

R denote the set of single-peaked preference relations such that there
exists some u
i
2 V that represents R
i
. Strict risk aversion implies that

R ( R.
Let D(X) denote the set of all distributions over X. Throughout this section a proba-
bilistic rule is a function ' : V
N
! D(X). Next, we reformulate our central properties by
replacing preference relations by utility functions.
Let Q, Q
0
be distributions over X. If for all i 2 N , u
i
(Q
i
)  u
i
(Q
0
i
) and for some j 2 N ,
u
j
(Q
j
) > u
j
(Q
0
j
), then we call Q a Pareto improvement of Q
0
.
Pareto Eciency: For all u 2 V
N
, there exists no Pareto improvement of '(R).
Given u 2 V
N
and M  N , the restriction (u
i
)
i2M
2 V
M
of u to M is denoted by u
M
.
Similarly as before, (u
i
; u
 i
) denotes the prole obtained from u by replacing u
i
by u
i
.
Strategy-Proofness: For all u 2 V
N
, all i 2 N , and all u
i
2 V, u
i
('
i
(u))  u
i
('
i
(u
i
; u
 i
)).
For all u 2 V
N
and all  2 
N
, by u

we mean (u
(i)
)
i2N
.
Anonymity: For all u 2 V
N
, all  2 
N
, and all i 2 N , '
(i)
(u) = '
i
(u

).
No-Envy: For all u 2 V
N
and all i; j 2 N , u
i
('
i
(R))  u
i
('
j
(R)).
Equal Treatment of Equals: For all u 2 V
N
and all i; j 2 N , if u
i
= u
j
, then
u
i
('
i
(u)) = u
i
('
j
(u)).
Using strictly risk averse vNM-utility functions induces a stronger Pareto eciency
condition than using the ordinal preference extension. Same-sidedness is still implied, but
no longer sucient. In order to characterize Pareto eciency we introduce the following
notation.
Let Q be a distribution and for all i 2 N , Q
i
= [p
0
i
 0; p
1
i
 1; : : : ; p
k
i
 k] denotes the
induced marginal distribution. For all i 2 N , let
G
i
(Q
i
) = fl 2 K j p
l
i
6= 0g:
Hence, G
i
(Q
i
) denotes all amounts that agent i can possibly receive at Q (or equivalently,
G
i
(Q
i
) is the support of Q
i
).
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The following Lemma is due to Sasaki (1997), Lemma 6.3.
Lemma 3 (Sasaki, 1997) If a probabilistic rule ' : V
N
! D(X) satises Pareto eciency
on V
N
, then for all u 2 V
N
and all i 2 N there exists a number of objects a
i
2 K such that
G
i
('
i
(u))  fa
i
; a
i
+ 1g.
Using Lemma 3, we can derive a characterization of Pareto eciency on V
N
.
Lemma 4 A probabilistic rule ' : V
N
! D(X) satises Pareto eciency on V
N
if and only
if
(i) ' satises ex-post Pareto eciency on V
N
and
(ii) for all u 2 V
N
and all i 2 N there exists a number of objects a
i
2 K such that
G
i
('
i
(u))  fa
i
; a
i
+ 1g.
The only-if part of Lemma 4 follows from Lemma 3. We omit the proof of the if-part of
Lemma 4.
6
Lemma 4 implies that any Pareto ecient allocation can be represented as a vector of
nonnegative real numbers. Let Q be a distribution that is Pareto ecient for some u 2 V
N
.
Then Q can be represented as follows. According to Lemma 4, for all i 2 N there exists a
number of objects a
i
2 K such that G
i
(Q
i
)  fa
i
; a
i
+ 1g. By 
i
we denote the probability
at Q
i
for agent i to receive a
i
. Thus, agent i receives a
i
+ 1 at Q
i
with probability 1  
i
.
Using these unique probabilities, we can represent the distribution Q
i
by a unique number
q
i
2 [0; k]. Simply dene
q
i
 
i
a
i
+ (1  
i
)(a
i
+ 1) = (a
i
+ 1)  
i
:
Note that we have
P
i2N
q
i
= k. Thus, each distribution Q is identied with a unique
allocation (q
1
; : : : ; q
n
) 2 [0; k]
N
of k units of an innitely divisible commodity. Let
~
D(X)
denote the set of all distributionsQ 2 D(X) such that for all i 2 N there exists some a
i
2 K
for which G
i
(Q
i
)  fa
i
; a
i
+ 1g. Hence, a Pareto ecient probabilistic rule is a function
' : V
N
!
~
D(X). Let X (N; k) denote the set of all allocations that are obtained via some
distribution belonging to
~
D(X), i.e., X (N; k)  f(q
1
; : : : ; q
n
) j Q 2
~
D(X)g. Obviously, X (
X (N; k). Therefore, a Pareto ecient rule ' essentially splits the amount k of a perfectly
divisible good among the agents in N . Conversely, each vector (q
1
; : : : ; q
n
) 2 X (N; k)
6
The somewhat tedious proof of the if-part of Lemma 4 is available from the authors upon request.
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uniquely identies marginal distributions Q
i
and a (non-unique) distribution Q 2
~
D(X).
Note that single-peakedness on K implies single-peakedness on [0; k] if agents consider
assignments q
i
2 [0; k] that correspond to marginal distributionsQ
i
. Therefore, the problem
of assigning k identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences by using
a Pareto ecient probabilistic rule reduces to the problem of dividing the amount k of a
perfectly divisible homogeneous commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked
preferences.
So, any Pareto ecient probabilistic rule ' : V
N
!
~
D(X) induces a Pareto ecient
deterministic allocation rule :

R
N
! X (N; k) for the problem of dividing the amount k of
a perfectly divisible homogeneous commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked
preferences. Furthermore, if the probabilistic rule also satises strategy-proofness and no-
envy, then the induced allocation rule satises these properties as well. Any probabilistic
rule with uniform marginal distributions induces the uniform allocation rule and vice versa.
7
The domain

R satises the following \richness condition": given x
i
; y
i
2 [0; k], if
]x
i
; y
i
[\K 6= ;, then for all z
i
2 ]x
i
; y
i
[\K there exist preference relations R
i
;

R
i
2

R
such that p(R
i
) = p(

R
i
) = z
i
, x
i
P
i
y
i
, and y
i
P
i
x
i
. It can be checked that for example
for the proofs of Ching (1994) this condition suces to show that if a deterministic rule
 :

R
N
! X (N; k) satises same-sidedness, strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of
equals, then it is the uniform rule restricted on this domain.
All characterization results obtained for Pareto ecient deterministic rules  :

R
N
!
X (N; k) that divide a perfectly divisible homogeneous commodity among a group of agents
with single-peaked preferences also hold for probabilistic rules that assign indivisible iden-
tical objects to a set of strictly risk-averse agents with single-peaked preferences. Since the
marginal distributions of the uniform probabilistic rules in Section 4 only depend on the
peak prole, we dene these rules in the same way in the current context for proles of
utility functions.
Corollary 1 (Kureishi, 2000) When each agent is a strictly risk averse vNM-expected
utility maximizer, the uniform probabilistic rules are the only probabilistic rules satisfying
Pareto eciency, strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals.
7
Uniform Allocation Rule
~
U : For all R 2

R
N
, and all j 2 N ,
~
U
j
(R) 
(
min(p(R
j
); ) if
P
N
p(R
i
)  k;
max(p(R
j
); ) if
P
N
p(R
i
)  k;
where  solves
P
N
~
U
i
(R) = k.
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Since equal treatment of equals is implied by either anonymity or no-envy, in Corollary 1
we can replace equal treatment of equals either by anonymity (Sasaki, 1997) or by no-envy.
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